Measuring Price Protection In Zimbabwean Agriculture: A Preliminary Assessment by Kolajo, Ebenezer F.
DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
AND EXTENSION
WORKING PAPER
r A
MEASURING PRICE PROTECTION IN ZIMBABWEAN AGRICULTURE: 
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
BY
EBENEZER F. KOLAJO
WORKING PAPER AEE 5/92
V
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & EXTENSION 
FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE 
P.O. BOX M P 167, MOUNT PLEASANT, HARARE 
ZIMBABWE
MEASURING PRICE PROTECTION IN ZIMBABWEAN AGRICULTURE:
A  PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
by
EBENEZER F. ICOLAJO*
Working Paper AEE 5/92
Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension
Faculty of Agriculture
University of Zimbabwe
P.O. Box MP 167
Mount Pleasant
Harare
ZIMBABWE December, 1992
a Former Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension, University of 
Zimbabwe, now Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of the 
North.
This research was supported by the UZ/M SU Food Security in Southern Africa Project, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.
The au thor wishes to thank T. S; Jayne and J. B. Wyckoff for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily express 
those of the Department, University or any other institution.
Working Papers are published with minimal formal review' by the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Extension.
MEASURING PRICE PROTECTION III ZIMBABWEAN AGRICULTURES 
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
Interventionist, policies, in Zimbabwean agriculture .have a 
long history, dated back to 1931 wheri.the Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB) W£\s established. After independence in 1900, the govern­
ment objectives for intervening .in the agricultural sector 
assumed a new dimension as elucidated in the Transitional
National Development Plan (1982-85). Some of the objectives 
included the use of .pricing-policies to achieve both national and 
regional food self-sufficiency,; to intensify the role of agri­
culture as a major foreign exchange.earner* and to bridge the
economic imbalances of pre-independence era betv/een^the-commer-
----------    ------------------— ——  ~ ......... ■ —  — ■ —  — ------------------------------------ —  ^
cial and peasant-agricultural sectors by integrating the latter 
into the mainstream, of national agricultural system..- While the
above objectives, among others^ rwere vigorously pursued;by the
government, .it remains an empirical issue whether or not 
intended results were .achieved .and at. what costs.
.There .has . not been' a- concensus as to .whether agricultural 
pricing policies, pursued in -Zimbabwe in the 19.80 s had been
provision.ist or protectionist in nature The price policies
pursued had a dual characteristic of stimulating both the 
producer and the consumer, in. such a way that the goals of 
maintaining food self-sufficiency and cheap food supplies were 
simultaneously achieved. r Judging from an. economic point of vi.ew', 
however, the interventionist price policy has been argued to 
imbed some level of. distortions•-and is, therefore, inefficient* 
That is, even when producer prices provide adequate incentives, 
the structure of relative producer prices emanating from such 
policy may not reflect the optimum production pattern. This is 
much more so where both producer and consumer prices are 
negotiated prices-— -the outcome of a political process rather than 
of the forces of supply and demand.
In many African countries, monopsonistic marketing agencies 
have been used to undervalue and appropriate resources from 
export agriculture by setting administered producer prices 
exceedingly low (Bates). Unlike those countries, the policy
environment in Zimbabwe has not, relatively speaking, discouraged 
productlon-^^ceiitives— ^ consumer £ood_Dricos--JiifirC3ajnulta-‘ 
neously kept low. The "cost” of the overall agricultural price 
policies, however, lias resulted in large subsidies With a 
groaning effect on the treasury. The budgetary burdens of the 
price and subsidy policies, coupled with operational inefficiency 
and distributional inequity of the same, tend to negate the 
government's objective of economic growth with equity.
An apparent manifestation o f .distortions in the sector may 
be indicated by the magnitudes of losses incurred by the 
parastatal marketing boards, namely, Grain Marketing Board (GMB) , 
Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) , Cold Storage Commission (CSC), and 
Dairy Marketing Board (DMB). Table 1 shows the annual deficits 
of the four main agricultural marketing boards in Zimbabwe from 
1901 to 1990. Given the magnitudes of the deficits, some 
relevant questions to be asked are: On whose behalf were these 
losses incurred-—  the producers or consumers? Is there a more 
efficient way of minimising these losses? Who are the main 
beneficiaries?
The overall objective of this study is to quantify the 
welfare distributions of agricultural price policies with respect 
to producer and consumer subsidies and their consequent implica- 
tions for food security in Zimbabwe. This objective is evaluated 
by measuring" the extent to which the government has actually 
influenced economic incentives in the agricultural sector since
independence and the distributional effects of price 
interventions on producers and consumers.
This paper is organised .into five sections. Following the 
introduction, the second section analyses the theoretical 
implications of crop pricing policies in Zimbabwe. The third 
section presents the analytical framework of this study. Section 
four discusses the study results. The fifth section concludes 
the paper by drawing some policy implications in light of the 
current economic structural adjustment program that is now taking 
place in the country.
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OP AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICY IN ZIMBABWE
The theoretical implications of -'agricultural price policy 
in Zimbabwe's crop sector can be explicated.with the use of the 
classical production function alongside demand and supply 
relationships. The classical production function depicts the 
technical relationship between inputs and outputs,■•while the 
conventional demand-supply relationship indicates the responses 
of market participants to changes in prices.
Zimbabwe's agricultural sector in the 1980s was 
characterised by massive government interventions right from the 
production to retail market-levels., While most of the agricultu­
ral policies pursued had been in place prior to independence, the 
relevant question to ask is whether or not the policies are 
achieving the intended objectives and at what costs. Herbst 
noted that "apart from steel and fertiliser, agricultural pro­
ducts are the only commodities whose prices are determined by the 
full Cabinet." This shows the government's level of commitment 
to maintaining food self-sufficiency and to avoiding the politi­
cal embarrassment of depending on South Africa for food imports.
In setting prices for the controlled crops, the cost-of- 
production (COP) approach was used for determining respective 
producer prices. The COP approach for setting prices is 
theoretically untenable in the sense that it poses another 
question. That is, whose cost should be used in order to attain 
efficiency as well as equity? The COP approach cannot adequately 
answer this question. By its nature, the COP approach inhibits 
the willingness to devise cost-reducing innovations and attracts 
excess resources into the sector because it imbeds an implicit 
subsidy. The President of Commercial Farmers' Union of Zimbabwe 
confirmed at a seminar in 1990 that "we are high-cost producers."
Figure 1 can be used to explain the above point of view. The 
COP approach, coupled with preplanting announcement of producer 
prices (instituted in mid-1970s), has encouraged farmers to 
pursue, among others, the goal of maximising yields. From panel 
A of Figure 1, given the input-output price ratio (Px/Py) , the 
yield maximising level of input is X, at ouput B, whereas profit 
(or efficiency) could have been maximized using input Xc to
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produce output T.
Relating panel A to panel B, the pricing policy pursued by 
the government- (i.e., using the COP approach to arrive at 
negotiated prices for controlled crops) can be further explained 
by using the supply and demand relationship. In panel B, the 
market-clearing price Pe is obtained at output Y„ where supply and 
demand equilibrate. But the agricultural pricing policy in 
Zimbabwe has introduced some income transfer measures into the 
sector. The policy lias generated botli consumer’ and producer 
subsidies, as well as some dead-weight losses. The maize pricing 
policy in the 1980s call be used to bolster this argument.
In panel B, Pp represents the producer price paid to farmers 
by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), while Ps is the controlled, 
selling price. The assumption here that Pp is greater than P, is 
not unrealistic, given the prevailing situation in the early 
1980s whereby many peasant farmers shifted towards selling all 
their grains since they could purchase heavily subsidised maize 
meal in return (Stanning and Muir). Child, Muir and Blackie also 
noted that consumer prices have continually fallen below producer 
prices, and that the situation lias made the national food subsidy 
to increase from Z$26 million in 1979/80 to Z!?123 million in 
1982/83. This was also confirmed in the Ecoxiomic Review of the 
Agricultural Industry of Zimbabwe (1983) that:
"there were fewer retentions than anticipated due to all 
classes of farmers delivering maize to the Grain Marketing 
Board and buying back their requirements in the form of 
milled roller meal, which was available at heavily subsidised 
rates" (p.13) .
The above observations contradict Schneider's generali­
sation that "efforts to procure domestic staples through official 
parastatal organisms are seldom successful for institutional 
reasons....[tjhis lack of success is apparent, for example, in 
all the Scihelian countries, where the state is the sole legal 
purchaser of cereal grains, yet in none does the state purchase 
a significant portion of the market surplus. State monopsonies 
in the cereals sector are rarely capable of competing with pri­
vate traders, especially where farm size is small, agricultural
4
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production is dispersed, and transportation is poor" (p.843).
Inspite of all the conditions indicated by Schneider, tlie 
observations are obviously inapplicable to the situations in some 
southern African countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. In 
Zimbabwe, the communal area farmers increased their sales to the 
GMB from 38,000 tonnes in 1980 to 819,000 tonnes in 1986. The 
transport subsidy emanating from panterritorial pricing probably 
encouraged greater maize production and sales to the GMB, while 
perceived subsidies, coupled with regulations, inhibited private 
trading. Similarly in Zambia, maize is sold through the 
cooperative movement and the National Agricultural Marketing 
Board (NAMBOARD) . Simula et al. noted that "for maize the rural 
market is almost nonexistent (in Zambia). There is little rural 
storage for off-season sales or for own consumption.... farmers 
sell their crop as soon as the marketing season Opens and start 
purchasing maize flour from the market" (p.67). In these 
countries, it was possible for the governments to purchase a 
significant portion of the market surpluses because of the 
pricing policy. "For example, before May 1987 NAMBOARD purchased 
a 90 kg bag of maize at K55.00 and sold it at K35.00 to millers. 
The difference of K2O.O0 was absorbed by the government as ah 
explicit subsidy" (Sipula et al., p.69).
In view of the above, the pricing policy in the 1980s had 
been used to transfer incomes to both consumers and producers. 
The relative magnitudes of these transfers, however, depend on 
the elasticities of demand for and supply of output. The dead­
weight loss imbedded in the agricultural pricing policy 
represents the cost of inducing excess resources into production. 
For example, in Figure 1, the optimum level of input use is Xe 
(panel A) and the optimum level of output is Ye (panel B) . 
Because of the nature of the pricing policy adopted, X, input was 
used, leading to production of Y,. While output Y, may be 
suboptimal from an economic point of view, it meets the suffi­
cient condition for production from the political point of view.
One of the government's policy objectives was to attain food 
self-sufficiency without critically examining the cost of 
achieving the same. In panel B, the area designated as the dead­
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weight loss resulting from the pricing policy may also be 
interpreted as the cost of food self-sufficiency. This is 
particularly so considering the amount of export losses incurred 
annually by the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AKA) . As shown 
in Table 2, some of the excess food grains purchased domestically 
are being exported at a loss. While the dead-weight loss due to 
export dumping or subsidy may be politically acceptable, it 
indicates that the structure of relative producer prices had 
failed to signal the optimum production pattern required for 
economic efficiency.
Export dumping of food grains may be justified from other 
grounds which are not essentially political. Export reduces the 
storage costs of unwieldly carry-over stocks and facilitates the 
raising of domestic producer prices. Export also provides an 
access to international trade shard and hence foreign exchange 
earnings. To the extent that the above points may be true, one 
has to examine critically whether or not the associated benefits 
outweigh the costs. There is no doubt that there are gains 
associated with bilateral trading, of which exporting is a 
component part. Thus, if the producer prices paid to farmers 
were competitive world-market prices * exporting excess grains 
will be an ideally prudent policy. In such a case, prices 
received by the farmers are sustained by increases in demand 
which resulted from export market expansion. But if the domestic 
producer prices are higher than the parity prices, excess 
px-oduction generated for the sake of export .in response to a 
false price stimulus will be detrimental to the economic well­
being of the nation and will not be sustainable. This is so 
because a competitive atmosphere is not fostered.
From the above points of view, we can surmise that the 
pricing policy agenda pursued in Zimbabwe during the 1930s might 
have responded well to political needs but not to a sustainable 
economic agenda.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The focus of this analysis is limited to the pricing.
policies in the 1980s, just to serve as a guide to necessary
 ^ '
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policy adjustments for the 1990s. The objectives of this research 
will be accomplished by measuring the level of price protection 
in Zimbabwean agriculture. Simply put, price protection is 
determined by comparing the percentage difference between the 
domestic and border prices of a given commodity. Border prices, 
defined as c.i.f. import prices of imported goods or f.o.b. 
export prices of exported goods, are the reference prices that 
would prevail under no government intervention and represent the 
opportunity costs of tradable goods. Border prices are often 
used as a benchmark for assessing the effects of a pricing 
policy. If the domestic price is less (greater) than the border 
price ■, it means that the producers of that particular commodity 
are being taxed (subsidized) implicitly. The words tax and 
subsidy are used here to symbolize the incentive effects of a 
pricing policy. By measuring the" extent of price protection wo 
imply that there is a relationship between the level of price 
protection and the degree of sectoral income transfers vis-a-vis 
distortions in resource allocation in the sector.
Three crops are considered in this analysis, namely, maize, 
sorghum and wheat. Each of these crops is unique in its own way 
to the Zimbabwean agricultural economy. Maize grows well in the 
more fertile and wet parts of the country. Maize is a staple 
food crop, as well as an important export crop. In the 1980s 
maize had been used in barter or triangular trades to supplement 
the domestic ..requirements for wheat. Sorghum is the crop that 
grows well in the drier parts of the country, especially where 
most of the communal area farmers are concentrated. Herbst 
(p.89) remarked that "...the Cabinet linked sorghum price 
directly to maize price so that peasants who could not grow maize 
could still receive some drought relief from the government via 
its pricing policy.'* In the light of this, it will be 
interesting to see to what extent the government had used its 
pricing policy as a way of income transfer or political reward; 
Wheat is an important food crop in the country, if the long 
queues for bread in shops can be xised as a "barometer** for 
measuring importance. The country is not self-sufficient in 
wheat production and domestic requirements are often met by
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importing-- sometimes by triangular or barter trades. Wheat 
grows in Zimbabwe during the dry, winter season and must 
therefore be irrigated. As a result of the huge capital outlay 
involved, wheat is entirely grown by large-scale, commercial 
farmers. Some analysts have argued that if the price is right 
such that it provides adequate production incentives, Zimbabwean 
farmers could produce enough wheat (Morris). From this line of 
argument, it will be interesting to examine how the pricing 
policy had affected production incentives of this essential crop.
The Cost of Foreign Exchange Regulation
In order to analyze the nature of price protection with 
respect to the above-mentioned crops, the theory of exchange rate 
will be brought to hear in the analysis. Considering the fact 
that Zimbabwe pursues a stringent foreign exchange policy, 
government intervention in the market place usually results in 
a state of excess demand for foreign exchange. This is 
particularly so in the sense that the official exchange rate 
(OER) is below the equilibrium exchange rate, leading to an over­
valued dollar. While regulations are linked to parallel or black 
markets for foreign currencies, desperate buyers who could not 
obtain enough from the official source will be ready to pay a 
"premium", i.e., pay over and above the OER. The amount that 
these individuals will be ready to pay above OER (i.e., the 
premium) will be greater as the divergence between OER and the 
black market exchange rate is greater and as the regulatory 
structure, penalties, transaction costs, etc., make it more 
difficult and costly to supply foreign currency to the black 
market (Culbertson).
This concept of the foreign exchange situation in Zimbabwe 
is realistic when one notes the intricacy of the foreign currency 
rationing process for business purposes. Up to as late as 1990, 
the foreign exchange allocation to commercial imports by 
individual firms was still linked to a firm's share of the 
1964/65 imports of a specific tariff item. The implication of 
this policy was that any firm that had not existed would unlikely
exist under the system in so far as existence is contingent on 
ability to obtain foreign exchange (Cuthbertson and Wilson). 
Thus, the policy environment favored the flourishing of foreign 
exchange transactions through the black market.
To exemplify the importance of exchange rate policy in this 
analysis, the blocked fund arrangements (BFA) in the country 
illustrates the relevance of accounting for foreign exchange 
premium. The difficulty imposed by the foreign exchange policy 
necessitated BFA which stipulated special provisions for 
expatriating funds. Under the BFA, companies (individuals) could 
keep blocked funds for 20 years (12 years) with the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe at a tax-free, interest rate of 4 percent after which 
the funds could be expatriated. The funds could otherwise be 
invested in the country without the opportunity to remit the same 
outside the country. Thus, the opportunity cost of obtaining 
foreign currency is very high. ,
As a result of the stiff foreign exchange regulations in the 
country, black-market trading becomes an essential consideration 
in a meaningful analysis of price protection of tradable 
commodities. According to World Currency Yearbook (p.212) , black 
market activities in Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) currency had begun 
at the beginning of World War II. Moreover, the isolation of the 
country during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
era caused black-market transactions in foreign currency to 
flourish. The failure of the government to overhaul the foreign 
exchange regulations put in place for a purpose in the UDI era, 
coupled with overvalued OER, makes no change in the story of 
black-market transactions in foreign exchange today in Zimbabwe. 
The overvalued OER thus becomes an implicit tax on the export 
industries whereby there was not much incentive to supply enough 
foreign currency to equilibrate the market. The resultant effect 
was foreign exchange rationing in the form of an import licensing 
scheme. Table 3 shows the estimates of shadow exchange, rates 
(SER) for the Zimbabwean dollar in the 1900s. The SER embodies 
the scarcity value of foreign exchange thereby accounting for 
transaction cost and risk premium.
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Measuring Distributional Effects of Pricing Policy
The effects of pricing policies on incentives can be 
categorized into direct and indirect effects (Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes). The direct price intervention (i.e., sector-specific) 
captures the effects of subsidies, price controls, quotas, and 
other policies affecting domestic prices. The indirect price 
intervention (i.e., economy-wide) captures the effects of all 
government policies, including overvalued exchange rate, fiscal, 
monetary and trade policies.
Two measures of agricultural price protection are used: 
nominal and net nominal rate of protection. Nominal protection 
rate (HPR) is defined as the percentage difference between 
domestic and border prices of a given commodity, where border 
prices are converted to the local currency unit by using the 
relevant official exchange rates (OER). NPR measures the effects 
of government price interventions comprising trade, fiscal, and 
monetary policies. Net nominal protection rate (NNPR) is 
obtained from the percentage difference between the domestic and 
border prices, when border prices are converted to the local 
currency unit by using the shadow exchange rate (SER). NNPR 
captures the totality of government policy effects. World 
commodity prices are obtained from FAO Production Yearbook and 
International Financial Statistics, and information on exchange 
rates are obtained from various issues of International Financial 
Statistics.
In addition to estimating the protection rates for the crops 
under consideration, the welfare impacts of the pricing policy 
are analysed by estimating both the producer and consumer 
subsidies embodied in the crop pricing policies of.1980s. The 
measurement, by commodity, are estimated on a year-to-year basis. 
Production data and domestic prices for the crops in question 
were obtained from various issues of Annual Reports and Accounts 
of Agricultural Marketing and Economic Review of the Agricultural 
Industry of Zimbabwe.
Producers' subsidy equivalent (PSE) measures the total 
policy transfers to producers. PSE is a broader measure of 
income transfer than the (net) nominal protection rates. In
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essence, it indicates the amount of subsidy that will be needed 
to compensate producei-s on removal of a government policy which 
affects a given commodity. This is estimated as the value of 
price protection plus direct (or budgeted) subsidy to producers.
(1) PSE = PPP + DSP, 
where
PSE means producers' subsidy equivalent;
PPP is the value of price protection to producers; and 
DSP is the value of direct subsidy to producers.
To simplify further
(2) PPP = VMPh - VHPW, 
where
VMPh means the value of marketed production at the 
government buying prices; and
VMPW means the value of marketed production at the 
world market prices.
Similarly
(3) DSP = IS + BP, 
where
IS represents the amount of input subsidy paid to 
producers; and
BP represents the amount of bonuses paid to producers 
(e.g., bonuses paid for early delivery).
Consumers' subsidy equivalent, on the other hand, is the. 
value of policy transfers to consumers. Consumers' subsidy 
equivalent (CSE) measures the explicit and implicit tax paid by 
consumers to finance agricultural producers. CSE can be 
estimated as follows:
(4) CSE = PPC + DSC.
However,
(5) PPC = (Pb - Pw)Qb; and
(6 ) DSC = (SC » V7P) (Q„ -  Q;) + (LCj -  WP)Qj PM + DR,
where .
PPC = Value of price protection to consumers;
DSC = Value of direct subsidy to consumers;
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Ph = Government procurement price per ton;
Pw — World market price per ton (conversion to domestic 
currency unit using OER or SER);
WP = Wholesale price ($Z) of commodity per ton;
Qh = Quantity of commodity (ton) sold locally;
Qi = Quantity of commodity (ton) imported;
SC ~ Estimated GMB's cost per ton of selling a 
commodity;
LCj = Landed cost per ton of importing a commodity;
PM = Amount ($Z) paid to millers or processors; and
DR = Drought relief payments (in the case of maize).
DISCUSSION OP RESULTS
ESTIMATES OF CROP PRICE PROTECTION
Tables 4-6 present tiie estimated magnitudes of price 
protection imbedded in the pricing policies affecting maize, 
wheat and sorghum production in the 1980s. When NPR or NNPR is 
positive, it.means that domestic producers had been protected. 
If NPR or NNPR is negative, it means that domestic piroducers had 
been penalized. Thus, estimated rates of price protection 
indicate whether the pricing policy is "subsidizing", or "taxing" 
producers of the commodities under study.
MAIZE
In Table 4, estimated NPR and NNPR for maize production 
during the 1900s are presented. The results of the analysis for 
maize show that maize producers did not, generally speaking, 
receive price incentives in the 1930s. The maize pricing policy 
in the 1980s "taxed" the producers in 7 of '.he 10 years analyzed 
by 6-29 percent, using NPR as a "barometer". In the years when 
maize farmers were being "subsidized" (i.e., 1982, 1986, and
1937) the rates of subsidy (22-44 per-cent) were greater than the 
implicit taxation. The estimates of NNPR show that maize farmers 
in Zimbabwe were heavily taxed in 8 of the 10 years. The level 
of implicit maize producers' taxation ranged from 2 to 55 
percent. The NNPR analysis indicates that maize farmers did not
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receive up to two-thirds of the world maize prices in 7 of the 
10 years analyzed.
The maize pricing strategy used in the 1900s seemed not to 
be highly sensitive to the world market prices. The domestic 
price increases were influenced more by political imperatives 
than by economic considerations. The inept maize pricing policy 
in the 1980s was based on the erroneous feeling that large-scale 
commercial farmers, who traditionally were the major producers 
of maize, lutd been making supranormal profits from "generous" 
producer prices paid by the GMB.
To counter the insensitive maize pricing policy of the 
1980s, the area planted to maize by large-scale, commercial 
farmers declined from 207 000 hectares in 1980/81 season to 132 
000 hectcires in 1986/87 growing season—  a more than 50 percent 
decline! While the area planted to maize and maize deliveries 
to the GMB by communal farmers reached a remarkably high level 
in the 1980s, the pricing policy of the time tended to hurt the 
peasant farmers more. For example in the 1988/89 season, 
communal farmers delivered more maize to the GMB than the large- 
scale, commercial farmers, even though the latter's average yield 
per hectare was, at least, three times the former. The large- 
scale, commercial farmers had changed their crop-mix patterns by 
allocating less and less resources to controlled crops whose 
pricing policy was considered to be less favourable. On the 
other hand, the less endowed communal area farmers, with little 
or no overhead costs, were less responsive to policy measures 
which implicitly taxed them. At the time when the communal area 
farmers continued to increase the area planted to maize, the 
large-scale, commercial farmers had considerably reduced maize 
liectarage but nearly doubled the area planted to soyabeans 
between 1984 and 1988 (Economic Review of the Agricultural 
Industry of Zimbabwe, 1989).
WHEAT
Table 5 presents the results of wheat pricing policy in the 
1980s. In absolute sense, domestic wheat prices steadily and 
consistently increased in the 1980s. For example, wheat
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producers received a domestic price per ton of Z$115 in 1980 
which increased to Z$365 in 1989 (i.e., more than 200 percent 
increase). Using NPR as a measure of protection, wheat farmers 
were protected in the 1980s. With the exception of 1980 and 1989 
when the NPR values were very low (2 percent and 1 percent, 
respectively), the farmers were subsidized by 12 to 58 percent 
above the price that would have prevailed had the government not 
intervened in the market place.
In contrast, when the general macroeconomic distortions were 
considered, the NNPR values suggest that wheat farmers were not 
protected enough. According to the NNPR estimates, the farmers 
wore only subsidized in 2 of the 10 years evaluated (i.e., 1986 
and 1987). This suggests that if more price incentive had been 
given to wheat farmers, more of the product could have been 
produced thereby reducing the amount of foreign currency expended 
on imports. The implicit tax rates on wheat producers ranged 
from one percent to 32 percent. The totality Of the effects of 
government v/heat pricing policy, therefore, suggests that farmers 
were not given adequate price incentive to produce more wheat. 
In the light of this, government pricing policy in the 1990s 
should provide adequate production incentives to justify the 
allocation of more resources to wheat production. The triangular 
trading of maize for wheat might have caused some sort of cross­
subsidization between the two crops which could have masked the 
extent of wheat subsidization. On a comparative basis, however, 
the wheat pricing policy provided better producer incentives.
SORGHUM
Table 6 presents the results of the level of price 
protection resulting from sorghum pricing policy in the 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 1909, the nominal domestic and border prices of 
sorghum more than doubled. On a comparative basis, the border 
prices of maize were higher than sorghum's from 1983. Although 
the two crops exhibited a similar price movement in the world 
market, the domestic procurement prices of sorghum were brought 
to parity with maize beginning from 1984.
While sorghum farmers were thought to be favorably compen-
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sated .in the political pricing Circle (i.e., relatively better 
than maize farmers) (Herbst) , the NPR and NNPR analysis did not 
support the contention. The NPR analysis shows that sorghum 
farmers were also taxed in six of the 10 years. The farmers were 
only subsidized in 1902 and 1986-1980. The NNPR analysis shows 
that only the pricing level in 1986 and 1907 could be tantamount 
to an implicit subsidy to sorghum farmers and that the farmers 
were just slightly better off than the maize farmers. Sorghum 
farmers, however, responded favorably to the "false" price 
stimulation by the government. The government's intention was 
to encourage and integrate the communal area farmers into the 
mainstream of the economy by providing market and price 
incentives. To some extent the aim was achieved. Production 
shifted from maize to a lower-cost crop, sorghum, which drasti­
cally increased its deliveries to the GMB. While there was no 
demand expansion for the increase in sorghum produced, the excess 
stock accelerated the Board's carrying costs and deficits (Wright 
and Takavarasha).
WELFARE DISTRIBUTION OF CROP PRICING POLICY EFFECTS (1900-89)
The finance minister of Zimbabwe, Dr. B. T. Chidzero, said 
in his 1988 budget speech: "The high level of public borrowing 
or reliance on borrowing, particularly if the funds are not 
directed to revenue and foreign exchange generating areas, is 
self-defeating in that it will mean that a greater proportion of 
development resources for subsequent years is pre-empted to debt 
service, at the expense of growth and employment or maintenance 
of critical social services and infrastructure" (Government of 
Zimbabwe, p.27). The minister anticipated higher budget deficits 
in 1980/09 than in the previous years because of the existing 
structure of budgetary expenditures, expanded government services 
and growing subsidy commitments.
In the 1984/85 financial year, the Government paid, through 
the Ministry of Agriculture, a total subsidy of Z$128 million for 
ail agricultural products and another Z$22 million through the 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce. In that year, agricultural 
subsidies accounted for 47 percent of total government subsidies,
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while food subsidies alone accounted for 20 percent of total 
government deficits. Of the Z$355 million allocated to the 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in 1988/89, 
Z$185 million v/as earmarked for liquidating trading losses 
incurred by the government-controlled, agricultural marketing 
boards, while accumulated losses of Z$170 million of the Boards 
had to be carried over to 1989/90.
It is a matter of inconclusive verbal assertion in Zimbabwe 
that producers benefited more than the consumers from the huge 
Subsidies incurred annually by the government. This section 
presents the distribution of welfare effects of the crop pricing 
policy in Zimbabwe during the 1980s. Annually and on a crop-by­
crop basis, producers' subsidy equivalent (PSB) and consumers1, 
subsidy equivalent (CSE) are computed in order to determine the 
main beneficiaries and distributions of the subsidies.
MAIZE
Figures 2 and 3 indicate the distributions of both implicit 
and explicit subsidy (tax) that both producers and consumers of 
maize received (paid) through the pricing regimes employed by the 
government in the 1980s. The analysis in Figure 2 shows that the 
total subsidies associated with maize pricing in tine 1980s were 
essentially in favor of consumers. The estimates of total 
nominal maize subsidy to consumers ranged between Z$10 million 
and Z$117 million. The total (nominal) consumer subsidy averaged 
Z$71 million over the 10-year period analyzed. As shown in 
Figure 2, maize producers were marginally taxed in most of the 
years, except in three of the years when they received huge 
amount of subsidies. Over the 1980 decade, the total (nominal) 
subsidy to maize producers averaged Z$18 million. By interpre­
tation, it can be said that consumers benefited approximately 
four times the maize producers' benefits.
Figure 3 gives a more critical look at the magnitudes of the 
implicit and explicit maize subsidies of the last decade. Figure 
3 indicates that the magnitudes of subisidies in Figure 2 are 
exaggerated and that the taxes are undervalued. Total net 
nominal subsidy to maize consumers ranged from a low of Z$10
16
million to a high of Z$96 million, while the implicit consumer 
taxes ranged from Z$2 to Z$77million. The total net nominal 
consumer subsidy over the 10-year period averaged Z$17 million. 
In contrast, the total net nominal subsidy to maize producers 
ranged between Z$10 million and Z$37 million, while the tax 
ranged between Z$23 million and Z$:L81 million. The sum of the 
benefits and taxes to maize producers over the study period 
averaged -Z$46 million. In other words, maize producers were 
taxed more than they were subsidized in the 1980s. The conclu­
sion is that the maize.___prl.cincf.__policy in the 1980s heavily 
subsidized consumers and_ heavi_Xy— pena-lized the producers.
Given that the price structure for maize induced the communal 
area farmer's to produce and to deliver more maize to the GMB, 
they were the ones who bore the brunt of the implicit taxes.
WHEAT
Figure 4 presents the graphic illustration of the 
distributions of total nominal subsidy for wheat producers and 
consumers. As illustrated in the figure, both producer and 
consumer estimates of total nominal subsidy for wheat imply that 
the wheat pricing policy in the 1980s was clear, consistent and 
without any ambiguity. The wheat pricing policy subsidized both 
producers and consumers throughout the decade. The levels of 
subsidy to consumers were, however, much more substantial. The 
total nominal subsidy to consumers averaged Z$23 million over the 
period of the study. While the total nominal subsidy to producers 
was positive throughout the decade, the values continually 
trailed behind the corresponding values for consumers. The total 
nominal subsidy for producers averaged approximately Z$ll 
million. Stated differently, the average total nominal subsidy 
to producers was roughly half of the amount that accrued to 
consumers.
Figure 5 shows that in real terms, the wheat pricing policy 
in the 1980s actually taxed producers in 7 of the 10 years and 
more heavily so in 1989. The tax level was as minimal as 
Z$500,000 in 1982 and reached a peak of Z$43 million in 1989. 
While consumers were also taxed, their level of subsidization
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compensated for the tax loss. For example, the sum of the total 
net nominal producer subsidy (tax) averaged -Z$5 million per year 
while the corresponding average value for consumers was approxi­
mately Z$4 million. The implication of the wheat pricing policy 
in the 1930s was that, while the consumers were effectively 
subsidized, producers were not given enough incentives to 
compensate for other macroeconomic distortions as to ensure self- 
sufficiency in production.
/*
SORGHUM
The relative distributions of subsidies to both sorghum 
consumers and producers are illustrated in Figure 6. The subsidy 
element imbedded in sorghum pricing policy in the 1980s was much 
more beneficial to consumers than to producers. As shown in 
Figure 6, sorghum consumers were subsidized in 9 years and quite 
marginally taxed in one year. The consumer subsidies were 
greater in the second half of the decade. In contrast, the 
producers were subsidized in 5 years and taxed in 5 years. More 
implicit taxes were imposed on producers in the first half of the 
decade. However, the subsidy level was marginally greater than 
the tax burden. In relative terms, the consumer subsidies were 
four times greater than the producer subsidies. The total 
nominal subsidy to consumers averaged Z$3.3 million, while the 
average for producers was about Z$800,000.
Figure 7 shows that even though sorghum producer prices were 
brought to parity with maize producer prices, the sorghum pricing 
scheme in ,1980s favoured consumers more than producers. The 
total net nominal producer subsidy indicates that sorghum farmers 
were, in fact, taxed in eight years during the decade. This 
result essentially shows that the pricing scheme did not entail 
producer subsidy in a real sense. As a matter of comparison, the 
level of subsidy that accrued to maize farmers.were greater than 
for sorghum farmers. Similarly, sorghum farmers did not bear as 
much tax burden as maize farmers. Thus, this analysis does not 
give much credence to Ilerbst's claim that the sorghum pricing 
scheme was a compensatory mechanism by the Cabinet to reward 
sorghum farmers. The improvement in sorghum pricing was rather
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a subtle awareness of the damage done by the inadvertent pricing 
of the past which had forced communal area farmers to emphasize 
maize cultivation in a dry, less suitable, agroeconomic 
environment. The result of this analysis shows that sorghum 
farmers did not enjoy a preferential treatment as far as the 
level of price protection or total subsidy is concerned.
SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The crop pricing policies adopted in the 1980s affected each 
Of the crops analyzed differently. On a comparative basis, the 
.wheat pricing policy was the most consistent and favorable of 
the three crops analyzed. This was followed by sorghum and 
lastly maize. In absolute terms, maize was the most subsidized 
and taxed of the three crops. Over the 1980 decade, consu-mers 
received more subsidies than producers either in absolute or real 
terms. The average consumer benefits from maize more than 
tripled those received by farmers. Consumer subsidies relative 
to producers' were more than double for wheat and quadruple for 
sorghum in the 1980s.
Compared to many African countries, producer price protec­
tion in Zimbabwe is moderate, although the policy environment did 
not provide adequate incentive for agricultural production. The 
policy environment caused the commercial farmers to switch from 
production of politically sensitive food crops to cash crops. 
To the extent that the price structure for maize induced the 
communal area farmers to deliver more maize to the GMB, the maize 
pricing policy eventually taxed the ones it intended to protect. 
While the wheat consumers were effectively subsidized, the 
producers were not given adequate price incentives to expand 
production when evaluated in the context of the overall macro­
economic distortions. Contrary to expectations, sorghum farmers 
did not enjoy a preferential price protection or subsidy level.
From consumer perspective, the food pricing policy in the 
1980s provided cheap food for the people at an unsustainable 
level for the Treasury, causing inefficiency and inequities. The 
cheap food policy had been argued to have favored the urban 
consumers at the expense of rural consumers. The policy makers
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might have been taking refuge under the assumption that the 
people in the country-side have no food problems. Many studies 
have documented that food insecurity and malnutrition in the 
rural areas are serious (Sipula et al., Lele). A recent study 
by Jayne and Chisvo blamed food insecurity in the rural areas of 
Zimbabwe on the unidirectional and centralized grain marketing 
system plus the attendant regulations. Their survey results 
indicate that consumers in remote rural areas might be paying 30 
percent higher prices for maize meal than in an unregulated 
marketing system. This observation then questions the 
credibility of the pricing and marketing system on equity 
grounds. Lele pointed out, however, that in light of the low 
purchasing power of the remote rural house-holds, not even an 
efficient market could solve their consumption needs. The 
increasing rural-urban migration in recent years has been 
hypothesized to be a result of the unequal access to food given 
the realities of decreasing land productivity, overgrazed 
pastures, persistent drought and similar problems in the rural 
areas. The crowding effect of this migration has worsened 
unemployment and crime rates and has overstretched the 
infrastructural facilities or services in urban centers.
Some changes have been taking place in Zimbabwe since 1990, 
at least to restructure the economy. The adoption of the IMF and 
World Bank economic structural adjustment program is supposed to 
represent a step forward to reducing distortions in government 
policies through market liberalization. This program involves 
price reforms both internally arid externally and in factor and 
product markets. A few measures have been taken to correct the 
exchange rate misalignment shown in this study to have caused 
some problems in the efficiency and effectiveness of the pricing 
policy of the eighties. The premiums assigned to black-market 
transactions in foreign exchange because of the overvalued 
official exchange rates clearly indicate the intensity of price 
protection in the country. A competitive exchange rate is 
expected to enhance producer incentives for export crops.
Market liberalization also requires producers to be competi­
tive by devising cost-reducing methods without compromising
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quality. To achieve this objective, the government will have to 
do away with product price administration and therefore usher in 
a competitive price setting mechanism. This will mean higher 
prices for producers even though input prices will also go up. 
On the consumer side, cheap food prices will no longer be the 
order of the day. Each one will therefore be required to pay the 
economic value of the food purchased. In other words, food 
prices will go up because the new policy dispensation is to 
reduce government intervention, to reduce expenditure and to 
balance the budget.
The challenge for agricultural policy in the 1990s will be 
not to create a new set of distortions while removing existing 
ones. For the burden of adjustment not to overwhelm the less 
endowed, impoverished households, a targeted form of food subsidy 
will have to be provided by the government. In the government 
blue-print for the reforms, it was stated that "agricultural 
support prices will remain, but it is intended to rationalize the 
pricing policies with a view to reducing the burden of budgetary 
subsidies" (GOZ, p 14). While it is reasonable to give a minimum 
support to px*oducers, recognizing that many of them are 
susceptible to the vagaries of nature, it is equally important 
to remember the poor households who lack the purchasing power. 
Otherwise, this category of people will suffer the pangs of 
hunger. The policy adjustment needs to wear a "human face" by 
incorporating a targeted subsidy so as to save hundreds of 
children and women from inevitable agonies of hunger.
Unemployment is a crucial problem in Zimbabwe. A positive 
step during the adjustment years to lessen this problem will be 
to generate off-farm employment in the rural areas by developing 
infrastructure, such as roads, water, electricity, etc. This 
recommendation might be difficult to reconcile with the goal of 
cutting expenditures and balancing the budget. But extensions 
of such facilities have multiplier effects that will stimulate 
the development of the informal sector leading to easier access, 
petty trading, agroprocessing, service activities and resource 
diversification. Creation of job training opportunities, 
provision of small-scale credits, funding of research, provision
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of market information, and a considerable reduction of commodity 
and transport regulations and controls will have a synergistic 
effect on lessening the pains Of adjustment. Savings frOm the 
removal of panseasonal and panterritorial subsidies and a guarded 
decontrol of commodity prices will go a long way to make 1990 
policies an improvement over the 1980s'.
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ANNUAL DEFICITS FOR SELECTED AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARDS, 
ZIMBABWE, 1901-1950.
TABLE 1
FISCAL GRAIN MAR- COTTON MAR- COLD STORAGE DAIRY MAR-
YEAR KETING BOARD KETING BOARD COMMISSION KETIHG BOARD
• a a u e a ' a a a a a e o a  a  a  e  a  a
1981/2 3 0.7 (0.9) 33.3 18.4
1932/3 58.-5 12.4 45.C 35.6
1983/4 20.0 8.1 45.3 38.6
198-1/5 31.5 (56.0) 40.1 46.3
1985/C 52.1 14.3 33.4 55.6
1986/7 57.3 52.0 28.9 49.3
1987/8 66.1 35.4 37.2 51.3
1983/9 77.9 24.7 10.2 52.2
1989/0 59.2 15.2 32.5 59.8
ci/ Value in parenthes is indicates a surplus for that year.
SOURCE: Agricultural Marketing Authority •
ESTIMATED EXPORT LOSSES INCURRED BY THE GRAIN 
MARKETING BOARD ON SELECTED CROPS, ZIMBABWE, 1980-1989.
TABLE 2
YEAR MAIZE WHEAT SORGHUM
1900 (3.43) . 10.99 ’ - . '
1981 (1.96) 31.38 - ■ '
1982 6.98 - .
1983 29.92 ' . - ' 0.01
1904 13.35 - 1.48
1985 ' ' • - — '
1986 21.71 - ' 0.71
1987 54.40 , - 0.35
1988 11.51 ' - 0.45
1989 (16,04) - . 0.03
NOTE: Values in parentheses represent surpluses and 
(-) means there was no export.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATES OF SHADOW EXCHANGE RATE (SER) DERIVED FROM THE OFFICIAL 
EXCHANGE RATE (OER) AND BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE (BMER) FOR THE 
ZIMBABWEAN DOLLAR, 1980-89.
YEAR OER
<D
BMER
(2)
z$/us$-
(BMER-OER)
(3)
FEP
(4)
SER
(5)
--Z9/USS--
1900 0.65 1.06 0.41 0.39 0.90
1981 0.69 1.19 0.50 0.42 0.98
1982 0.76 1.20 0.44 0.37 1.04
1983 1.01 2.30 1.37 0.58 1.60
1904 1.25 2.86 1.61 0.56 1.95
1985 1.61 2.38 0.77 0.32 2.13
1986 1.67 2.22 0.55 0.25 2.09
1907 1.67 2.63 0.96 0.37 2.29
1988 1.79 3.03 1.24 0.41 2.52
1989 2.12 4.00 1.88 0.47 3.12
(1) Monthly official exchange rates (OER) were averaged over the
calendar year and expressed in domestic currency per US$. 
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Quarterly Digest of
Statistics, various issues; and IMF, International Finan­
cial Statistics, various issues.
(2) Monthly black market exchange rates (BMER) were averaged 
over the calender year and expressed in Z$/US$. Source: 
Philip P. Cowitt (Ed.), World Currency Yearbook. Publi­
shed by International Currency Analysis, Inc. Brooklyn:
New York, various years.
(3) The absolute difference between BMER and OER.
(4) Foreign Exchange Premium (FEP) is calculated as follows: 
[(BMER - OER)/BMER] or [1 - (BMER/OER)].
(5) Shadow Exchange Rate (SER) is calculated as follows:
[OER (1 4- FEP)]. SER is used in converting border prices of 
tradable commodities expressed in foreign currency to its 
opportunity cost in domestic currency.
ESTIMATES OF BORDER PRICES, NOMINAL PROTECTION RATES (NPR) AND NET 
NOMINAL PROTECTION RATES (NNPR) FOR MAIZE PRODUCED IN ZIMBABWE, 
1900-1909.
TABLE 4
Year Domestic 
Procure­
ment Price
World
Market
Price
Border
Price
(OER)
Border
Price
(SER)
Nominal 
Protec­
tion Rate
Net Nominal
Protection
Rate
(Z$/mt) (US$/mt) <Z$/mt) <Z$/mt) <%) <%)
1980 60.50 12 6 81.90 113.40 -2 6 -47
1981 85.00 131 90.39 128.38 - 6 -34
1982 120.00 110 83.60 114.40 44 5
1983 120.00 136 137.36 217.60 -13 -45
1984 120.00 136 170.00 265.20 -29 -55
1985 140.00 112 180.32 238.56 -22 -41
190 6 180.00 88 146.96 183.92 22 - 2 ' '
1987 180.00 76 126.92 174.04 42 3
1988 180.00 107 191.53 269.64 - 6 -33
1909 195.00 111 235.32 346.32 -17 -44
1/ Domestic procurement price is the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
buying price for grade A maize.
2/ The world market price for maize used is for USA no.2 yellov/, 
fob Gulf. The conversion rate used is 1 mt. = 39.368 bu. 
maize. Source: FAO Production Yearbook, various issues.
3/ Border price (OER) is obtained by converting US$/mt to Z$, 
using the official exchange rate (OER), while border price 
(SER) is converted by using shadow exchange rate (SER).
4/ Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) is defined as [(P /P ) - 1]100, 
where P is converted to the local currency using OER. Net 
Nominal Protection Rate (NNPR) is defined as NPR except that 
P is converted to the local currency by using SER- NPR and 
NNPR arc not adjusted for transport, storage and administra­
tive costs because of the panterritorial and panseasonal 
pricing.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATES OF BORDER PRICES, NOMINAL PROTECTION RATES (NPR) AND NET 
NOMINAL PROTECTION RATES (NHPR) FOR WHEAT PRODUCED IN ZIMBABWE, 
1980-1989.
Year Domestic 
Procure­
ment Price
World
Market
Price
Border
Price
(OER)
Border
Price
(SER)
Nominal 
Protec­
tion Rate
Net Nominal
Protection
Rate
(Z$/mt) (US$/mt) (E$/mt) <3$/int) (%) (%)
1900 115.00 173 112.45 155.70 2 -26
1901 135.00 175 120.75 171.50 12 -21
1982 165.00 161 122.36 167.44 35 - 1
1983 190.00 158 159.58 252.80 19 -25
1984 220.00 153 191.25 298.35 15 -2 6
1985 250.00 138 222.18 293.94 13 -15
1986 285.00 115 192.05 240.35 48 19
1987 300.00 114 190.38 261.06 58 15
1988 330.00 146 261.34 367.92 26 -10
1909 365.00 171 362.52 533.52 1 -32
1/ Domestic procurement price is the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
buying price for grade A wheat.
2/ The world market price used for wheat is for USA hard winter, 
no.2 ordinary protein, fob Gulf. The conversion rate used is 
1 mt. =36.744 bu. wheat. Source: FAO Production Yearbook,
various issues.
3/ Border price (OER) is obtained by converting US$/rat to Z$, 
using the official exchange rate (OER), while border price 
(SER) is converted by using shadow exchange rate (SER).
4/ Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) is defined as [(P /P ) - 1J100, 
where P is converted to the local currency using OER. Net 
Nominal Protection Rate (NNPR) is defined as NPR .except that 
P is converted to the local currency by using SER. NPR and 
NNPR are not adjusted for transport, storage and administra­
tive costs because of the panterritorial and panseasonal 
pricing .
ESTIMATES OF BORDER PRICES, NOMINAL PROTECTION RATES (NPR) AND NET 
NOMINAL PROTECTION RATES (NNPR) FOR SORGHUM PRODUCED IN ZIMBABWE, 
1980-1989.
TABLE 6
Year Domestic 
Procure­
ment Price
World
Market
Price
Border
Price
(OER)
Border
Price
(SER)
Nominal 
Protec­
tion Rate
Net Nominal
Protection
Rate
(Z$/mt) (US$/mt) (Z$/mt) (Z$/mt) (%) (%)
1900 75.66 164 106.60 147.60 -29 -49
1901 105.00 160 110.40 156.80 - 5 -33
1902 115.00 136 103.36 141.44 11 -19
1903 115.00 129 130.29 206.40 “12 -44
1984 120.00 119 148.75 232.05 -19 “52
1905 140.00 103 165.83 219.39 -16 -36
190 6 100.00 83 138.61 173.47 30 .4
1987 180.00 73 121.91 167.17 48 8
1908 180.00 99 177.21 249.40 2 -28
1989 195.00 107 226.04 333.04 -14 -42
1/ Domestic procurement price is the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
buying price for grade A sorghum.
2/ The world market price used for sorghum is for USA milo no.2, 
fob Gulf. The conversion rate used is 1 mt. =» 22.046 cwt 
(100 lb.). Source: FAO Production Yearbook, various issues.
3/ Border price (OER) is obtained by converting US$/mt to Z$, 
using the official exchange rate (OER), while border price 
(SER) is converted by using shadow exchange rate (SER).
4/ Nominal Protection Rate (RPR) is defined as [ (P /P ) - 1].100, 
where'' P is converted to the local currency using OER. Net 
Nominal Protection Rate (NNPR) is defined as NPR except that 
P is converted to the local currency by using SER. NPR and 
NNPR are not adjusted for transport, storage and administra­
tive costs because of the panterritorial and panseasonal 
pricing.
FIGURE 1 A MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICE
DISTORTIONS IN ZIMEABWES CROP SECTOR
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FIGURE 2. NOMINAL SUBSIDY FOR
MAIZE IN ZIMBABWE (1980-1989)
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FIGURE 3. NET NOMINAL SUBSIDY FOR
MAIZE IN ZIMBABWE {1980-1989}
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FIGURE 4. NOMINAL SUBSIDY FOR
WHEAT IN ZIMBABWE (1980-1989)
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FIGURE 5. NET NOMINAL SUBSIDY FOR 
WHEAT IN ZIMBABWE (1980-1989)
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FIGURE 6. NOMINAL SUBSIDY FOR 
SORGHUM IN ZIMBABWE (1980-1989)
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FIGURE 7. TOTAL NET NOMINAL SUBSIDY 
FOR SORGHUM IN ZIMBABWE (1980-1989)
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